Using a unique database of 990 VC-backed Belgian firms and a complete population of SMEs in Belgium, we investigate the differences in the return generating process in the venture capital-baked firms and their peers that operate without venture capital financing. Focusing on regular financial returns, we analyze the extent to which the presence of a venture capital investor affects the sensitivity of VC-backed firm's returns to the changes in capital structure, in operating cycle, and in the industry dynamics. The differences may occur from the self-/selection of better companies into venture capital portfolios, from venture capitalists' value-adding activities, and/or from both. We examine them in the context of complex simulation procedure with allows separating selection from value-adding when other traditional approaches are difficult to implement. Our results indicate that venture capital-backed firms are able to extract more rent from the changing industry conditions, and from the optimizations in capital structure and financing choices. The presence of the venture capitalists in the equity of the firm seem to have only a marginal effect on operating cycle efficiency. Overall the results are suggestive of the value-adding being the main driver for the VC-backed firm performance.
Introduction
understand and develop appropriate (re)actions to the changes in the underlying mar-ket/industry conditions. Scholars documented that human capital characteristics of VCs 145 help reducing the failure rate of the portfolio firms (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005) . It has 146 also been shown that VC's involvement affects underlying portfolio firm's strategic choices 147 in terms of product market strategies (Hellmann and Puri, 2000) . It is therefore straight-148 forward to assume that VC-backed firms will further benefit from changes in respective 149 industry conditions in comparison to their non-VC-backed peers.
150
The foregoing mechanisms are directly related to the regular financial performance 151 of the portfolio firms. The selection argument, however, implies that VC-backed firms 152 should be indistinguishable from their non-VC-backed peers as long as their comparability 153 is asserted. This means that changes in these factors will affect the performance of both 154 type of entrepreneurial firms in the same way, which leads to the following hypotheses:
155 H1a: Financial performance of VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed peers will 156 be affected in the same way by the changes in the operating cycle in these firms.
157
H2a: Financial performance of VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed peers will 158 be affected in the same way by the changes in the capital structure in these firms.
159
H3a: Financial performance of VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed peers will 160 be affected in the same way by the changes in the external environment around these 161 firms.
162
The value-adding arguments suggest that operations of VC-backed firms are more ef-163 ficient 5 , and that financing and strategic decisions are more appropriate to the dynamic 164 environment around these firms. Under such structure, we may expect VC-backed firm's 165 performance to react faster to the changes in these factors in comparison to the non-VC-166 backed peers. This discussion leads to the following set of alternative hypotheses:
167
H1b: Financial performance of VC-backed firms will be more sensitive to the changes 168 in the operating cycle compared to non-VC-backed firms.
169
5 Even if the efficiency is not an objective, we may expect that VC's involvement still benefit the operating process in terms of cost-reductions and value enhancements.
H2b: Financial performance of VC-backed firms will be more sensitive to the changes in the capital structure compared to non-VC-backed firms.
171
H3b: Financial performance of VC-backed firms will be more sensitive to the changes 172 in the corresponding external environment compared to the non-VC-backed firms.
3 Method and data

174
The test of the foregoing hypotheses is directly related to the selection and value-adding 175 arguments proposed in the literature. Separating the two is a very challenging task. cause of the selection, venture capital financing becomes endogenous to performance, which 177 inflates the values of parameters of performance factors. Include value-adding activities into 178 the picture, and the effect of the performance factors could be even more exaggerated. The 179 classical solution to the endogeneity problem is the instrumental variable (IV) approach. Instead, he suggests to estimate a structural model, similar to the two-stage Heckman's 183 selection models (Heckman, 1976 (Heckman, , 1979 . This approach makes use of a selection equation, 184 which, in turn, requires observable information on the investor characteristics. In our case, 185 the latter are not available, thus we need an alternative solution.
186
The procedure devised for testing the proposed conjectures is based on the simulation 187 method. We use two types of datasets, which we call main sample (MS) and peer groups 188 (PG). The construction of each of the samples is described below. 
Sample construction
190
The empirical setting of this paper is the Belgian venture capital industry during the period 
207
Peer groups (PG) are constructed in several steps, following the matching procedure 208 suggested by Megginson and Weiss (1991) , Lerner (1999), and Manigart et al. (2002) .
209
First, for each VC-backed firm in the sample we record the values of total assets and total 210 revenues in the year immediately prior to the venture capital injection. 9 Next, using NACE-211 BEL 2008 21 class codes (3 digits), each VC-backed firm in the MS is matched with its 212 respective industry. Basing on the amounts of total assets and total revenues, noted earlier, 213 6 It is worth noting that this list is all we have as an initial input. Unfortunately, we do not possess any information regarding the investor or the deal, e.g., the valuation, the number of subsequent financing rounds, the investor type, the syndication, etc.
7 The coverage of Belgian venture capital deals in these databases is far from complete. 8 All companies in Belgium, regardless their listing status or size, are obliged to file complete financial statements with the National Bank of Belgium. They are next compiled into the commercially available BELFIRST electronic database.
9 For start-ups, we took the corresponding values in the injection year.
we identify to which empirical decile of the corresponding industry each VC-backed firm Some companies in the sample show zero values of AGE and EM P L. AGE is 0 if a company is venture backed from inception. We force NA initial value for the AGE in such cases. EM P L may take the value of 0 when company does not employ staff in the legal sense, e.g., contract workers with the status "independent". We add 1 to the EM P L variable to force the existence of logs.
14 We checked for the partial correlations with lags (Ljung-Box Q-stat) as well as for the presence of the variables, we first set a basic autoregressive empirical model:
where subscripts t and i denote the time and company, respectively. Second, the residuals 282 of the Equation (1) are used as the response variable to control for the dependency between 283 the regressors (X) we use in our principal model:
Finally, we reconfigure the principal model using Equations (1) and (2) such that
Equation (3) The first loading (βi) represents the cross-section fixed effect constant, followed by the common factor betas, which are assumed to be constant over time and cross-sections. The term ui, t should be considered as an independent variable in Equation (3), since its value is determined earlier in Equations (1) and (2).
sensitivities estimated on the MS-only sample and the the average of sensitivities from the 296 simulations. Alternatively, if VCs do bring changes and additional value to their portfolio 297 firms, we should observe significant changes in the sensitivities.
298
Results
299
Two distinct specification approaches are used to test the proposed hypotheses. To begin,
300
we benefit from the availability of the annual financial data on each portfolio firm to estimate The MS estimate of the capital structure (EA_T A) variable shows some unexpected 339 results. First, it appears to be greater than the simulated mean (-0.281 vs. -0.300). Second, 340 the implied difference of about 6.3% is significant (see Table 4 ). This structure suggests 341 that future increases in the financial performance due to reductions in equity are more 342 pronounced when VC is not present in the firm. In other words, non-VC-backed firms 343 benefit more from the increases in debt levels compared to their VC-backed peers. This Moreover, this suggests some nonlinear effects of the capital structure variable, which are 354 tested in the following section. We will come back to the H2b after these analyses. On balance the results seem to be in line with our discussion on the incremental impact 362 of VC financing due to value-adding. An alternative explanation, namely, the selection 363 hypothesis suggests that VCs just select better companies (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Sørensen, 2007) . If that is the case, then the seemingly superior performance of the VC-365 backed firms should be replicated by their comparable non-VC-backed peers. Therefore, 366 the sensitivities of returns to the changes of the corresponding determinants should be 367 indistinguishable for both VC-backed firms and their peers. Following our results, we posit 368 that selection is highly unlikely to be a main factor for the VC performance. Table 5 reports the results of the simulation with the quantile regression approach.
402
As in the preceding section, we reproduce the MS estimates of the model specification estimates and simulated means of the quantile process follow a somewhat growing pattern.
424
For both MS estimates and the simulated means, the effect of the operating cycle efficiency 425 is negative in the lowest quantiles, and positive in the highest quantiles of the distribution.
426
Simulated means switch sign around the median of the distribution, whereas MS estimates 427 do so after the fourth quantile (τ = 0.4). Specifically, the literature suggests that VCs spend more effort on the ventures, which are 448 already performing well (Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1994 Sapienza et al., , 1996 , forcing the greater and high performing firms. This structure is in line with H3b, and implies that VC-backed 466 firms are able to extract considerable value from the dynamics of external environment.
467
On balance, we observe that VC presence in the company amplifies the portfolio firm's 468 reaction to the changes in the capital structure and in the industry dynamics. To a lesser 469 extent the same conclusion can be applied to the operating cycle efficiency variable. firms react slightly faster to the changes in operating cycle, whereas the difference is almost 497 negligible in the most performing firms (both VC-backed and non-VC-backed ones).
498
One of the implications of this study is that we are able to measure and test the impact 499 of the VC presence on the determinants of firm's regular performance at a company level. 
508
Some future developments in this direction are possible. For example, due to the nature 509 of our data, we are unable to control directly for the VC's type, experience, reputation, and 510 level of involvement. Consequently, it is impossible to test whether a particular investor, a 511 more experienced, or reputable one, is associated with specific areas of firm performance.
512
For example, captive venture capitalists related to banks and other financial institutions 513 may put more emphasis on the financing choices and capital structure optimization in the 514 portfolio firms. Alternatively, investors experienced in a particular industry may better 515 affect the way portfolio firms integrate in their respective industries. This, in turn, could 516 explain why, in some cases, the presence of VC is beneficial, and in others is only marginal.
517
Our analysis assumed constant effects of the return determinants over time, hence the 518 differences in sensitivities of VC-backed firms and their peers are set to be stable. It is 519 however plausible to assume that comparable firms may show some convergence to the 520 VC-backed firms in a longer time horizon. The analysis of this structure, however, would 521 require much larger sample that we currently have. Industry maturity measure, independent variable Natural log of industrial assets' value V A_T A (4) Product maturity measure, independent variable
522
Value added / Book value of total assets P AY OU T (5)
Payout over retention, control variable Dividends distributed / Retained earnings LIQ (6) Debt servicing ratio, here liquidity ratio, control variable Debt charges (interest payments) / EBIT LOG(AGE) (7)
Age of the portfolio company, control variable Natural log of the age of the portfolio firm LOG(EM P L) (8)
Number of employees, control variable Natural log of the number of number of employees in full time equivalent
IN JY EARDU M (9)
Dummy for injection year, control variable 1 since injection year onwards, 0 otherwise ACID (10)
Strict liquidity ratio, here acid test, control variable (Accounts receivable + treasury placements + cash) / Short term debt CU RREN T _RAT IO (11) Current ratio, control variable (Current assets -long term current liabilities) / Short term debt
Free cash flow over tier funds, control variable
Free cash flow after tax / (Deferred taxes and provisions + Total Debt) N ET _REN T _CA (13) Current assets operating profitability, control variable
Operating income / Current assets
T RESO_RAT IO (14)
Treasury ratio, control variable (Treasury placements + cash -shortterm financial debt) / (Current assets -long-term accounts receivables)
The ratios are computed following Ooghe and Wymeersch (2006) discussion. 
(8)
(10) 
(10)
CF_E (1) 1.00
E_TA ( The table summarizes the results of 10000 iterations of the panel regression model with robust standard errors (White estimates). β i stands for the constant term. E_T A i, t is the equity ratio, measured by the value of equity in the total book value of the assets of company i in year t. V A_T A i, t is the value added in the total book value of the assets of company i in year t. ∆(LOGIN D i, t ) represents the growth rate of the corresponding industrial assets for company i in year t. The detailed description of the variables is available in the previous chapter; definitions are summarized in Table 1 . The column "MS estimate" shows the parameter estimates for the sample of VC-backed firms only (MS). Mean, median, SD, min, and max refer to the empirical distributions corresponding to each parameter. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively (two-tailed). The 
